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Abstract
This paper analyzes the options for international policy coordination in order to redress the global 
imbalances. The case for policy coordination rests on a number of assumptions such as the existence 
of important spillover effects of national policies and a common understanding of the nature of 
the problem. In reality, important obstacles exist to get to effective policy coordination, including 
resistance from domestic interest groups and disagreement of the effectiveness of policy instruments. 
These obstacles can be reduced by developing a multilateral consensus on common goals and by 
addressing commitment problems via issuing multi-year schedules for policy adjustments.
JEL Classification: F32, F33, F53
Keywords: Global imbalances, international policy coordination, international financial architecture.
Barry Eichengreen is a Professor of Economics and Professor of Political Science at the University 
of California, Berkeley, where he has taught since 1987. E-mail: eichengr@econ.berkeley.edu. He is 
also Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research (Cambridge, Massachusetts) 
and Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (London, England). He has held 
Guggenheim and Fulbright Fellowships and has been a fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in 
the Behavioral Sciences (Palo Alto) and the Institute for Advanced Study (Berlin).
Comments should be addressed by email to the author.UN/DESA Working Papers are preliminary 
documents circulated in a limited number of 
copies and posted on the DESA website at 
http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers to stimulate 
discussion and critical comment.  The views 
and opinions expressed herein are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect those of 
the United Nations Secretariat. The designations 
and terminology employed may not conform to 
United Nations practice and do not imply the 




Department of Economic and Social Affairs
2 United Nations Plaza, Room DC2-1428
New York, N.Y. 10017, USA




Introduction  ................................................................................................................................. 1
How Compelling is the Case for Coordination? ........................................................................... 5
Obstacles to Policy Coordination ................................................................................................. 8
What is To be Done?  ....................................................................................................................  17
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................  21
References ....................................................................................................................................  24Should There Be a Coordinated Response to the Problem of Global 
Imbalances? Can There Be One?1
Barry Eichengreen
Introduction
The problem of global imbalances continues to loom over the world economy. Although global growth was 
robust again in 2006, the U.S. current account deficit widened from its already high levels, raising questions 
about its sustainability. If the U.S. deficit is not sustainable, then foreign financing for it will dry up sooner 
or later.2 Since the country’s deficit will then have to be compressed, its saving will have to rise, meaning that 
consumption falls, or else investment spending will have to decline. Higher interest rates, reflecting falling 
foreign demand for U.S. debt securities, will be the mechanism bringing about this adjustment. The slow-
down in the growth of U.S. spending could then mean a demand and growth slowdown for the rest of the 
world. The one thing that could keep the U.S. out of recession would be if the fall in the dollar encouraged 
additional foreign demand for American exports. But even this would not be good news for the rest of the 
world, since it would imply real exchange rate appreciation, the intensification of import competition, and 
greater difficulty of exporting to the United States.
This scenario has motivated calls for action before the U.S. deficit widens further and the country’s 
foreign debt/GNP and foreign debt/export ratios significantly exceed current levels. Better, in this view, 
would be steps to gradually narrow the deficit starting now, thereby averting the danger of an abrupt fall in 
the availability of foreign finance and a sharp, disruptive adjustment. The U.S. could raise taxes or cut gov-
ernment expenditure to boost public savings. It could raise interest rates more sharply or take other public 
policy measures to encourage higher private savings.
The difficulty with this set of recommendations is that measures to narrow the U.S. deficit by slow-
ing the growth of consumption and investment demand will mean slower growth for the country and slower 
growth also for the world insofar as there is a fall in America’s demand for imports. The corresponding solu-
tion is policy adjustments in other countries. Asian countries with current account surpluses can boost do-
mestic spending by raising government outlays on health care, education and rural infrastructure.3 They can 
encourage household spending by spurring the development of markets for consumer and mortgage credit. 
European countries can redouble their efforts at structural reform; insofar as this resulted in faster growth 
and improved consumer confidence, demand in Europe would strengthen as well.4 Because the slowdown in 
demand growth in the U.S. would then be matched by an acceleration of demand growth in other countries, 
the level of demand worldwide will remain unchanged. In this scenario, growth in other countries no longer 
suffers as a result of more slowly growing demand in the United States. And, in turn, production in the 
United States is sustained, despite the slowdown in domestic demand, by increased demand from abroad.
1  This paper was prepared as a background study for United Nations, World Economic Situation and Prospects 2007 (Sales 
No. E.07.II.C.2;  http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wesp.html).
2  The “if” in this sentence is significant, as we will see below.
3  Doing so has already been accepted as an objective of the authorities’ most recent Five Year Plan.
4  It is sometimes argued that insofar as Europe is not the source of global imbalances—it has not seen policy adjustments 
giving rise to large surpluses—it need not play a role in their resolution. The counter-argument is that Europe has 
a stake in the orderly resolution of the current problem, and in particular in seeing that global demand growth is 
maintained at the same time U.S. demand growth slows (for discussion see Ahearne and von Hagen 2005).2  DESA Working Paper No. 69
With demand in the rest of the world rising relative to demand in the United States and each region 
spending disproportionately on its own goods, there will have to be some rise in the price of foreign goods 
relative to U.S. goods. In other words, there will have to be an adjustment of the real exchange rate between 
the dollar and other currencies (other currencies up, the dollar down). In this scenario, then, the exchange 
rate adjustments that are the most contentious aspect of the adjustment are simply the market’s response to 
these complementary policy initiatives.
Unfortunately, each of these policy changes is likely to be unattractive to the countries concerned 
if taken in isolation. Narrowing the U.S. deficit by slowing the growth of consumption and investment de-
mand will mean slower growth, something that Americans would not see as congenial. Similarly, narrowing 
current account surpluses in China and other surplus countries by stimulating public and private saving will 
aggravate the risk of overheating and fan inflation if undertaken in isolation. Only if U.S. policies to slow the 
growth of spending are accompanied by policies in other countries to stimulate the growth of spending will 
these adjustments appeal to the countries concerned.
These observations have prompted calls for the international coordination of economic policies to 
facilitate the orderly adjustment of global imbalances while at the same time maintaining global growth. Ex-
amples include the idea of a “grand bargain” (Buira and Abeles 2006), proposals for a “new Plaza Agreement” 
(Cline 2005), and calls for a “coordinated response” on the part of systemically important countries (Group 
of 24, 2006). Cline’s version is representative. He argues that there is the need for an initiative comparable to 
the 1985 Plaza Agreement to be undertaken by the G-20 group of industrial and emerging-market econo-
mies.5 The United States would set forth credible plans for eliminating its fiscal deficit over five years. U.S. 
trading partners would agree to allow their currencies to rise against the dollar. Countries that have been 
intervening in foreign exchange markets to prevent their currencies from appreciating would pledge to stop 
doing so. The Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank, which have not been intervening, could pledge 
to sell dollar reserves. The International Monetary Fund would provide advice on how much fiscal adjust-
ment and currency realignment is required.6
The analogy with the 1985 Plaza Agreement is direct.7 (See also Box 1.) Then, too, the U.S. was 
running budget and current account deficits, and commentators warned that the dollar’s level against foreign 
currencies was unsustainable (Krugman 1985). Current account imbalances fueling protectionist sentiment 
in the United States jeopardized the maintenance of an open trading system. In September 1985 the finance 
ministers of the five largest industrial countries (France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the 
United States) therefore met at the Plaza Hotel in New York and agreed on a package of coordinated policy 
adjustments designed to encourage currency and current account adjustment.8 The United States pledged 
to tighten its fiscal policy, while Germany committed to cut taxes and Japan agreed to stimulate domestic 
5  The G-20 is made up of finance ministers and central bank governors from 19 countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
Turkey, the United King and the United States, plus two European Union representatives (the president of the Council 
and the president of the European Central Bank).
6  A problem with Cline’s variant, which will be evident in light of the preceding, is that it does not include measures, 
fiscal or other, to directly stimulate spending outside the United States.
7  A comprehensive analysis of the Plaza Agreement is Funabashi (1989).
8  In March 1973, in an effort to foster cooperation in managing the problems created by the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods System, U.S. Treasury Secretary George Shultz invited the German, French and British finance ministers to an 
informal meeting at the White House. Japan’s finance minister was invited to join subsequent meetings, giving rise to 
the Group of Five. Summits followed once Schmidt and Giscard became heads of their respective governments; Italy 
was invited to attend in 1975 and Canada was invited in 1976, giving birth to the Group of Seven.Should there be a coordinated response to the problem of global imbalances?  3
The Plaza Agreement
The Plaza Agreement of 1985 is a widely-cited precedent for current efforts to arrange a coordinated response to the 
problem of global imbalances. In 1985, as today, observers pointed to the twin budget- and current-account deficits of 
the United States as a source of global imbalances, and there were worries that the dollar would have to fall significantly 
in order to return the international accounts to sustainable levels. (By early 1985 the greenback had risen by some 80 
per cent from the beginning of the 1980s.) Surging U.S. imports and the competitive difficulties of U.S. manufacturing 
industries, the automotive industry in particular, also raised the specter of a protectionist backlash, fanning fears for the 
maintenance of an open trading system.
But exchange rate adjustment without the adjustment of underlying policies was unattractive. Pushing the 
dollar down without at the same time taking steps to adjust the level of American spending threatened to fan inflation 
without bringing about current account adjustment. At the same time, implementing measures to reduce U.S. spending 
without simultaneously stimulating spending abroad only promised to depress global demand. But for other countries, 
adopting policies of domestic demand stimulus without the accompanying consolidation of demand in the United States 
was unattractive.
These realizations led finance ministers and central bank governors from the G5 countries, the United States, 
Japan, West Germany, France and the UK, to assemble at the Plaza Hotel in New York in September 1985. (On the origins 
of the G5, see footnote 8 in the text.) The U.S. committed to cut its budget deficit, while Japan promised to loosen mon-
etary policy and accelerate financial-sector reforms, and Germany agreed to implement tax cuts. France, the UK, Germany 
and Japan agreed to raise interest rates while the United States cut its, in order to place downward pressure on the dollar. 
Concerted intervention in the foreign exchange market was agreed in order to propel the dollar downward.
The results were mixed. The aftermath of the meeting was marked by a sharp fall in the dollar, which by the end 
of 1987 amounted to 50 per cent against both the Japanese yen and the German deutschmark, relative to the currency’s 
early 1985 peak. Although the United States did not follow through on its commitment to strengthen the budget balance, 
the fall in the currency, combined with foreign stimulus, was still sufficient to enhance U.S. export competitiveness and 
crowd in additional foreign sales, slowing the growth of the U.S. current account deficit. But that the decision to intervene 
in foreign exchange markets was the source of dollar adjustment is uncertain; the dollar had already begun falling some 
six months before G5 officials assembled in New York.a1 And as that fall accelerated, worries mounted about its adverse 
effects on inflation in the U.S. and loss of competitiveness in other industrial countries. Ultimately officials were led to as-
semble again, this time in Paris in late 1987, to negotiate another accord, this time to stabilize the dollar.
The 1933 World Economic Conference
The 1933 World Economic Conference (see Eichengreen and Uzan 1993) is another episode revealing of the obstacles to 
international policy coordination. Offcials assembled in London at the trough of the Great Depression to address problems 
of deflation, exchange rate instability, tariffs, and external debts. By early 1933, the value of world trade had fallen to less 
than 60 per cent of 1929 levels, reflecting the collapse of demand, falling prices, tariff increases, and the depressing effects 
of exchange rate instability. In most countries, prices had fallen sharply for three years, and competitive depreciations had 
transmitted deflation internationally. In a number of countries, above all Germany, external debts that had been rendered 
unsustainable by the collapse of production and trade, and in many cases they had negotiated or unilaterally imposed 
moratoria on payments with adverse effects on their financial systems and those of the creditor countries. 
1a  Frankel (1994) suggests that this earlier fall might be attributed to the Plaza regime more generally, insofar as 
it reflected concerted intervention by the U.S. and German monetary authorities in March-April 1985 and the 
accession to the U.S. Treasury of the more intervention-minded James Baker and Richard Darman. 
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spending by reforming its tax system. All five countries committed to intervening in the foreign exchange 
market to reduce the value of the dollar. The dollar fell by 4.3 per cent against the other major currencies on 
the day following announcement of the agreement. From there the greenback continued falling and the U.S. 
current account deficit began to narrow, until officials sought to stabilize exchange rates at their new levels by 
negotiating, in early 1987, another such agreement, the Louvre Accord.
While this episode is widely invoked in support of efforts to cooperate in correcting global imbal-
ances, this history also raises troubling questions. For one thing, there was no mechanism to bind govern-
ments to their commitments, and not all the policy adjustments agreed to at the Plaza were ultimately 
carried out. The dollar had actually begun falling several months before the agreement was negotiated; thus, 
it is not clear that the subsequent policy adjustments were necessary or, for that matter, responsible for con-
temporaneous currency adjustments.9 No sooner did governments begin pushing the dollar down that the 
process showed signs of getting out of hand. Indeed, it was fears that excessive dollar depreciation was fan-
9  Here, inevitably, there is a problem of imagining the appropriate counterfactual. One can imagine, for example, that 
the dollar might have begun rising again in the autumn of 1985 had there not been an agreement at the Plaza on 
coordinated policy adjustments; this would lead the proponents of currency adjustment to a more positive assessment 
of the agreement.
The 1933 World Economic Conference was an effort to acknowledge the interdependent nature of these prob-
lems and negotiate a coordinated response. The “grand bargain” that lay behind the decision to assemble governments 
in London would have entailed stabilizing exchange rates to reduce uncertainty, reducing tariffs to rebuild trade, and 
negotiating an orderly resolution of debt problems to eliminate the debt overhang that destabilized financial markets and 
depressed investment.
The United States was a key player in these negotiations: without willingness on its part to stabilize the dollar, re-
duce tariffs, and forgive foreign debts, negotiations could go nowhere. But neither was it attractive to the United States to 
offer concessions in the absence of a commitment on the part of other countries to do likewise. Dollar stabilization would 
only aggravate U.S. deflation if other countries continued to devalue competitively. Reducing tariffs would only weaken 
the country’s bargaining leverage in the absence of a more general tariff truce. And forgiving foreign debts – where the 
U.S. was the principal international creditor – looked unattractive if the country got nothing in return. Hence the key at 
London was to attempt to arrange an agreement between the United States and other countries.
In the event, no agreement was reached. Two obstacles, not unlike the obstacles to reaching a coordinated solu-
tion to global imbalances today, proved insurmountable. First, different countries adhered to different conceptual models 
of the causes of the depression. France saw it as reflecting the unwillingness of countries to play by the rules of the gold 
standard game, whereas the United States saw it as the result of the perverse operation of the gold standard itself. Thus, 
where the French saw exchange rate stabilization as essential for economic stabilization, the U.S. saw abandoning fixed 
exchange rates as a precondition for restoring stability and growth. These different interpretations reflected the two 
countries’ respective historical experiences. Efforts by opinion leaders to bridge this interpretative gap fell short under the 
circumstances.
Second, domestic interest groups opposed policy adjustments that might have rendered the country as a 
whole, and the world, better off. In France, tariff reductions were opposed by powerful agricultural interests suffering from 
the effects of low farm-gate prices. In the U.S., well-organized financial interests opposed debt writedowns that might 
have helped to jump-start investment. And the general economic situation, which was one of depressed macroeconomic 
conditions and severe fiscal problems, prevented use of the budget to make the requisite side payments.
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ning inflation in the U.S. and creating problems for its trading partners that led to the Louvre Accord two 
years later. Finally, it has been argued that the Plaza, together with subsequent efforts at policy coordination, 
had unfortunate side effects; in particular, excessive stimulus to the Japanese economy led to the financial 
bubble that burst subsequently, consigning the economy to a decade of depression.10
Moreover, the world has changed since 1985 in ways that complicate efforts to coordinate policies. 
Financial markets have grown, making it still more difficult to manage exchange rates. There are more sys-
temically-significant countries—from China to India to Russia to Saudi Arabia—increasing the number and 
heterogeneity of countries that would have to be party to an effective agreement. Existing groupings, from 
the G3 to the G5 to the G7, G10 and G20, are less than ideally constituted to address current problems.11 
In addition, there is even less agreement about the nature of the problem and the design of an appropriate 
response than in 1985. All this suggests that coordinating an appropriate macroeconomic response will be, at 
the least, challenging.
These are the topics taken up in the remainder of this paper. Section 1 first analyzes the validity of 
the case for policy coordination. Section 2 next considers the obstacles to a coordinated response. Section 3 
asks what can be done to surmount those obstacles. Section 4 then is a brief conclusion.
How Compelling is the Case for Coordination?
The current account imbalance between a country and the rest of the world—say, between the United States 
and its global partners—reflects policies and actions both at home and abroad. The easiest way of seeing this 
is by observing that a country’s current account is the difference between its savings and investment and that 
the global current account discrepancy should equal zero.12 The U.S. current account deficit is the excess of 
U.S. investment (I) over U.S. saving (S), while the surplus of the rest of the world is the excess of its saving 
(S*) over its investment (I*). From the balance-of-payments identity it follows that S-I = S*-I*. Immediately 
we see that a current account imbalance like that between the United States and the rest of the world is 
unlikely to reflect exclusively the actions of public- and private-sector agents on either side of the equation. 
Rather, domestic and foreign factors both contribute to the observed current account outcome. It follows 
that both domestic and foreign policy initiatives can contribute to its orderly resolution.
The case for international policy coordination rests on the assumption that each country or region’s 
policy adjustments have cross-border effects accruing as non-pecuniary externalities to its foreign counter-
part. For example, a decision by the United States to raise taxes or reduce government spending may have 
the direct effect of moving the U.S. current account deficit in desirable directions and U.S. growth in unde-
sirable directions, but also the external effect of moving foreign current accounts in desirable directions and 
foreign growth rates in undesirable directions.13 Analogously, decisions in Asia to cut taxes or raise govern-
10  See Kuroda (2004) on these links between the Plaza and the bubble economy. The hypothesis that loose Japanese 
monetary policy was responsible for the bubble and, in turn, that the Plaza Agreement was responsible for loose 
Japanese monetary policy has been disputed; see Posen (2003). Similarly, it can be argued that the depressed decade 
that followed reflected less the legacy of earlier monetary policies than the difficulty of adjusting to the end of catch-up 
growth, population ageing, and delayed adaptation to the imperatives of the information-technology revolution.
11  The problem with the G20, as we will see below, is not the omission of systemically significant countries but, to the 
contrary, its excessive inclusiveness and size.
12  That it does not reflects statistical misreporting unless there is trade with other planets.
13  This assumes that the direct expenditure effects of the fiscal initiative (U.S. residents spend less, including on imported 
goods) dominate its financial effects (fiscal consolidation by the U.S. puts downward pressure on interest rates and 
leaves more savings to finance investment abroad). I return to this assumption below.6  DESA Working Paper No. 69
ment spending may have the direct effect of moving Asia’s current account in desirable directions and Asian 
growth in undesirable directions, but also the external effect of moving both the U.S. current account and 
U.S. growth in desirable directions.14 One can well imagine that neither region will wish to adjust so long 
as these decisions are taken in isolation. In the U.S., policies that move the current account toward smaller 
deficit also move growth in undesirable directions, namely downward. In Asia, policies that move the current 
account toward smaller surplus again move growth in undesirable directions, namely upward, creating a risk 
of overheating. Assume that policy makers have chosen the level of fiscal effort that just balances the benefits 
of further fiscal improvement against the costs of further changes in growth, taking foreign policies as given. 
Then there will be no policy adjustments by either region in the absence of further shocks.15
Policy coordination has the potential to achieve superior outcomes by internalizing these externali-
ties. Assume as before that the initial situation is one where the U.S. current account deficit (foreign current 
account surplus) is unusually large, but growth in both regions is at its optimal level. Then the mythical so-
cial planner would recommend a combination of less expansionary U.S. fiscal policy and more expansionary 
foreign fiscal policy. Negotiations between governments to coordinate these adjustments are a way of achiev-
ing this same welfare improvement in a world of sovereign nations.
Note, however, that this case for policy coordination rests on a number of strong assumptions.
First, there are significant nonpecuniary spillovers of national policies. That first-order spillovers exist is 
not universally agreed. Some authors (viz. Feldstein 1988) have expressed skepticism that domestic policies 
constituting the national optimum are not also the global optimum.16 The skeptics appeal to macroeconomic 
models in which spillovers are small.17 To some extent the small magnitude of estimated spillovers reflects the 
fact that international integration is still limited; thus, U.S. imports are only 14 per cent of U.S. GNP, where 
full integration would imply that U.S. imports as a share of U.S. GDP would instead equal one minus the 
U.S. share of global GNP, which would imply an import share more on the order of 80 per cent. Since the 
U.S. accounts for 25 per cent of global economic activity, a 14 per cent import share means that U.S. im-
ports account for less than 4 per cent of the GNP of the rest of the world.18 To some extent it reflects the fact 
14  The assumption that the adjustment of Asia’s current account in the direction of balance would be desirable could 
be grounded in the observation that the region’s large surpluses fan protectionist pressure abroad (as in the Plaza 
precedent) or that foreign inflows are increasingly difficult to sterilize and therefore inflationary. The assumption that 
fiscal stimulus by itself would have undesirable effects on growth could reflect fears of overheating, as noted above.
15  The “absence of further shocks” proviso is a way of suggesting that the situation described in the text is one of Nash 
equilibrium. That is, each government (or set of governments) takes the policies of its counterpart as given. Each player 
is assumed to be on its reaction function. And the system is assumed to have settled down at the intersection of the 
respective reaction functions.
16  This was also the conclusion of early Chicago-School models of flexible exchange rates, where it was assumed that 
optimal policy chosen in the presence of a flexible rate would allow a country to attain the first-best optimum. 
Typically, it was assumed that wages and prices were fully flexible, that foreign policy impulses were felt only through 
the trade balance, and that the current account could be treated with benign neglect. Clearly, these are not appropriate 
assumptions for the case at hand. Feldstein also argues that policy coordination initiatives may create an attention-
deficit problem—that it may distract policy makers from the need for appropriate domestic policy responses.
17  There is some debate over whether the latest generation of policy coordination models (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2000, 
Corsetti and Pesenti 2001) strengthen or weaken the case. Cazoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001) suggest, not entirely 
surprisingly, that the answer depends on the size and correlation of shocks. 
18  Of course, U.S. imports are a larger share of rest-of-world trade than they are of rest-of-world GDP. Cutting the 
U.S. current account deficit by half (i.e. by $400 billion) would imply a drop in world trade by 5 per cent. How this 
would affect foreign economies depends on their trade exposure in general, their trade exposure to the United States in 
particular, and the magnitude of the associated multiplier effects.Should there be a coordinated response to the problem of global imbalances?  7
that policy instruments can have offsetting effects neutralizing one another in the aggregate. For example, 
fiscal expansion will have the direct effect of stimulating the exports of neighboring countries but also the 
indirect effect of driving up global interest rates and thus limiting foreign absorption.19
Second, negotiators share a common understanding of the structure of the model (that is, of the structure 
of the world economy). Otherwise agreement on mutually beneficial policy adjustments may be difficult to 
achieve. Worse yet, adjustments in the name of policy coordination may result in macroeconomic changes in 
welfare-reducing directions.20
Third, there do not exist additional distortions rendering otherwise be welfare-enhancing policy adjust-
ments counterproductive. Rogoff (1985) has offered a famous example of counterproductive cooperation 
when monetary policy makers have a commitment problem—when they are tempted to inflate to drive up 
employment—and knowing this the private sector forms higher inflationary expectations, leading actual 
inflation to be excessive. In such a setting, the danger that the currency will depreciate in response to a mon-
etary expansion helps to restrain the central bank. Correspondingly, an international agreement to stabilize 
exchange rates may only aggravate the situation.
Fourth, governments have the freedom and flexibility to adjust domestic policies as part of international 
negotiations. In practice, this is not always the case. Monetary policy is in the purview of the central bank, 
not the government that is typically party to international negotiations. This distinction matters impor-
tantly in an era of central bank independence. In democracies, fiscal policy is made not by executive fiat but 
requires the consent and sometimes the initiative of the congress. Adjustments may have to be negotiated 
not just internationally but domestically. Officials may be wedded to an ideology that prevents them from 
embracing the case for coordinated adjustments. In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan’s economic advisors Donald 
Regan and Beryl Sprinkel were ideologically wedded to monetarism and laissez faire; the more activist ap-
proach required for international policy coordination had to wait on their replacement by the more prag-
matic James Baker and Richard Darman. Similarly, in the current environment the ideology of tax cuts and 
the strategy of “starve the beast” make it more difficult for the U.S. to offer revenue enhancement as part of 
an international bargain. Politics and ideology thus may prevent a successful conclusion from being reached.
Fifth, there exists a mechanism to bind governments to their agreement. In the static Nash set-up that is 
the framework for textbook discussions of policy coordination, a government that is party to a cooperative 
policy agreement has an incentive to renege. Assuming no changes in foreign policies (the Nash assumption), 
it has an incentive to move back onto its reaction function. Equivalently, it has an incentive to announce its 
willingness to engage in coordinated policy adjustments, in the hope that other governments will do their 
part, without actually following through itself. As in other settings, sustaining the cooperative outcome will 
require repeated interaction, an outside mechanism for punishment in the event of reneging, or something 
else to make commitments credible.21
Thus, significant preconditions must be satisfied before one can be confident that policy coordina-
tion is welfare improving and before there is reason to hope that effective coordination can be achieved.
19  The case analyzed in the introduction and earlier in the present section assumes, in line with most empirical macro-
models, that the first channel dominates. But the fact that there may also exist a second countervailing channel leaves 
open the question of the magnitude of the net effect.
20  Frankel and Rockett (1988) show that the danger of welfare-reducing policy adjustments is quite real when policy 
makers do not agree on the true model.
21  This commitment problem and mechanisms for solving it are discussed at length by Meyer, Doyle, Gagnon and 
Henderson (2002).8  DESA Working Paper No. 69
Obstacles to Policy Coordination
The literature stimulated by the Plaza Agreement (e.g. Cooper 1989, Frankel 1989, Eichengreen and Uzan 
1993) points to the obstacles that must be overcome for international macroeconomic policy coordination to 
occur. That literature highlights three potential obstacles: interpretative disagreements, distributional con-
flicts, and a shortage of adequate policy instruments. This section considers them in turn.22
Interpretive Disagreements. A substantial literature, summarized in Frankel (1989), suggests that interpre-
tive disagreements can be an obstacle to policy coordination. Clearly there is no shortage of interpretive 
disagreements in the current context.
There is disagreement about the causes of the present constellation of global imbalances.23
There is disagreement about the current position of the economies concerned. If U.S. economic 
growth remains robust, then the kind of tax increases and expenditure reductions described in the previous 
section can contribute to the correction of the country’s twin deficits without damaging the prospects for 
continued growth. But if the odds of recession are high—due to the advanced stage of the expansion, higher 
energy prices, the weakening housing market and rising levels of consumer indebtedness—then tax increases 
are the last thing that the economy needs. Similarly, if the Chinese economy is at risk of overheating, then 
monetary tightening and currency appreciation will work to sustain rather than damage growth. If, on the 
other hand, current rates of economic growth are sustainable and there is minimal danger of overheating, 
then the contractionary effects of monetary tightening cum currency appreciation should be offset by expan-
sionary fiscal policy.
There is disagreement about future prospects: about how rapidly the U.S. and Chinese economies 
can growth, about how quickly the two countries will move away from their current growth models, and 
about for how long the dollar will retain its “exorbitant privilege” as the leading international currency.
Finally, there is disagreement about the magnitude and even the sign of cross-border spillovers.
The standard analysis motivating calls for policy coordination points to inadequate saving in the 
United States and excessive saving in the rest of the world as root causes of the imbalance. U.S. gross national 
saving has fallen to 13.6 per cent of GDP on the IMF’s measure, down by 3.3 per percentage points from the 
1983-2000 average and barely half the levels prevailing in the rest of the world.24 Authors like Roubini and 
Setser (2004) and Frankel (2006) blame the decline in U.S. savings rates on fiscal policy. They observe that a 
decline in public saving like that which occurred in the U.S. since 2001, a period that has seen a swing in the 
fiscal balance from +2.5 per cent of GDP to -3.5 per cent of GDP, will lead to a matching decline in national 
saving and a matching deterioration in the country’s current account balance, other things equal. They at-
tribute the growth of budget deficits to a combination of tax cuts (with the share of federal revenues in GDP 
falling from 22 per cent to 19 per cent under the Bush Administration) and to increases in outlays.25 They 
observe the coincidence in time of the decline in gross saving and the rise in the U.S. current account deficit, 
22  Although not all at the same length. Disparities in how much space I devote to these four potential obstacles reflects 
how much attention has been devoted to the surrounding issues in the previous literature.
23  Previous enumerations the alternative interpretations include Roubini and Setser (2004), Eichengreen (2006a,b) and 
Frankel (2006).
24  The estimates of savings rates in this and subsequent paragraphs are from BIS (2005).
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the implication being that the “other-things-equal” assumption, two sentences back, is not a bad approxima-
tion to reality.26 In particular, there has been no rise in private savings to offset the decline in public savings, 
as predicted by the theory of Ricardian equivalence and the advocates of the Bush Administration’s tax cuts; 
to the contrary, household saving has fallen to the point where it is now in negative territory. National saving 
remains positive only as a result of strong corporate profitability and high corporate saving rates.
In the world as a whole, meanwhile, gross savings rates rose by 1.7 percent of GDP between 1991 
and 2004. With the U.S. accounting for a quarter of the world economy, the corresponding rise in non-U.S. 
savings as a share of GDP is 2.5 per cent. The rise in savings rates is most dramatic in developing Asia, where 
it amounted to 9.5 per cent of GDP over the period, and in China in particular, where it came to 9.6 per 
cent.27 This rise in saving has no single cause, but the dominant factor is probably faster economic growth 
and the absence recently of disruptive crises.28 This rise in foreign saving in turn suggests that policy adjust-
ments in the United States cannot by themselves bring about a smooth resolution of global imbalances—
insofar as the explosive growth of the U.S. current account deficit has taken place in a period of exceptionally 
low interest rates. If a decline in U.S. saving was all that was going on, after all, one would expect to see 
unusually high U.S. and global interest rates, not unusually low ones as has been the case in recent years 
(Bernanke 2005).
Were this universally agreed, a consensus on the nature of desirable adjustments—encourage saving 
in the U.S. and spending abroad—would not be hard to achieve. In fact, however, there exist alternative 
views with different implications. To start, there are perspectives attributing global imbalances to investment 
rather than savings behavior. In this view, capital has flowed toward the United States because the flex-
ibility of the country’s markets and its facility with new technologies render it an attractive place to invest. 
The country’s flexible labor markets, market-based financial system and lightly regulated economy, which 
facilitates the entry and exit of firms, have contributed to its leading role in the development and adoption 
of internet-related (and now biotech- and nanotech-related) technologies. Since the mid-1990s U.S. pro-
ductivity growth has accelerated, reflecting the country’s facility in the development and utilization of new 
technologies. While productivity growth has been fastest in the computer-producing sector, new technolo-
gies have also delivered efficiencies in the service sector (with, inter alia, the advent of big-box stores utilizing 
just-in-time inventory control and the reorganization of back-office functions in financial institutions).29
The implication, drawn by authors like Bachus and Lambert (2005), Cooper (2004), Clarida 
(2005), Levy (2005), Mandel (2006) and Plosser (2005), is that the U.S. international economic position 
26  Others, starting with Bernanke (2005), will disagree. 
27  In Europe and Japan, in contrast, savngs rates have fallen, which is a reminder that the problem of global imbalances is 
first and foremost a problem between the United States and Asia ex Japan.
28  Simple life cycle theory would suggest a negative relationship—that households expecting higher future incomes 
would borrow against those higher future incomes now. In part, evidence of the opposite is explicable by cohort effects: 
young people in the labor force who save do so out of higher incomes than old people who dissave out of wealth 
accumulated from what were previously lower incomes. This was famously demonstrated by Modigliani (1970). In 
addition, in countries like China imperfect financial markets and credit constraints may play a role. The young would 
like to borrow against higher future incomes in order to, inter alia, purchase consumer durables but cannot owing to 
imperfect markets; hence savings rates are higher than would be the case otherwise. Chamon and Prasad (2005) show 
that if credit constraints are severe they can produce a positive correlation between the growth rate and the savings rate. 
For China this suggests that savings rates will decline both as growth falls from the double digits to more normal levels 
and as financial markets develop.
29  That the productivity effects have not been limited to the computer-producing segment of the economy is important to 
the argument, given that computer production accounts for only 6 per cent of U.S. GDP.10  DESA Working Paper No. 69
is, in fact, entirely sustainable. The country’s debt/GDP and debt/export ratios will not explode because the 
rapid productivity, output, and export growth made possible by high levels of capacity expansion, financed 
in part by foreign investors, will grow the denominators of these ratios. American observers subscribing 
to these arguments see higher taxes designed to choke off private spending as unnecessary on the grounds 
that the country’s residents, who benefit from this faster productivity growth, have higher personal incomes 
(Cooper 2006). They will see higher interest rates designed to limit the excess of investment over saving as 
counterproductive.
But calculations like those of Timmer et al. (2003) suggest at most a ½ per cent economy-wide 
productivity differential between the U.S. and Europe between 1995 and 2001.30 This would seem to be 
too small to drive a 6-per-cent-of-GDP swing in the U.S. current account.31 And, of course, productivity 
has been growing even faster in other places, such as China. Moreover, the fact that an increasing share of 
foreign finance for U.S. current account deficits has been provided in recent years by foreign central banks 
rather than private investors is hard to square with the notion that the trans-Pacific imbalance reflects the 
incentive for foreigners seeking high returns to invest in the United States. Assuming that the purchase 
and construction of actual production facilities is the form of foreign investment that is most responsive to 
productivity differentials, there is also the uncomfortable fact that FDI is flowing out of the country on net; 
maybe this means that other parts of the world are not so disadvantaged from the point of view of take-up of 
new technologies after all. Finally there is the fact that U.S. investment rates have risen only slightly over the 
period. For some, these are compelling objections to the interpretation of global imbalances as driven by the 
attractiveness of investment in the United States. But they have not convinced everyone.
Rajan (2006) has developed the intellectual complement to this story, arguing that the growth of 
the trans-Pacific imbalance also reflects the weakness of investment in Asia ex China. In Japan, investment 
has been depressed since the mid-1990s by the bursting of the bubble economy and the country’s decade-
long slump. In the crisis countries of East Asia, investment collapsed in 1997-8, and governments have been 
concerned to insure against renewed instability by accumulating international reserves, something they have 
achieved by running their economies under less pressure of demand. For Asia ex China and Japan, invest-
ment rates fell by 8.7 per cent of GDP between 1996 and 2004.32
If this decline in investment demand is permanent, then more global savings will presumably be 
available indefinitely to finance U.S. investment. By itself, this does not ensure the sustainability of the U.S. 
deficit, but it makes adjustment less urgent. Those who see some of the investment in the pre-crisis period as 
inefficient, reflecting industrial policy makers’ fixation on high levels of capital formation, presumably sub-
scribe to this view. Even if investment in emerging East Asia now begins to recover, along with investment 
in Japan, this may be offset by declining investment rates in China, it being doubtful that the country can 
efficiently invest 50 per cent of its GDP for the foreseeable future. The more widely this perspective is held, 
the less pressure policy makers feel to negotiate and implement policy adjustments.
30  And at least of some of that may have been temporary, reflecting a larger contribution of capital formation in the 
United States in the Internet-Bubble years ending in 2000, together with the negative effects on European investment 
of fiscal consolidation in the run-up to the creation of the continent’s monetary union.
31  Subsequent data suggest a further acceleration in U.S. output per hour in the nonfarm business sector, although that 
acceleration may have petered out after 2005, and recent data revisions suggest a somewhat smaller acceleration relative 
to the late 1990s.
32  See Macfarlane (2005) and Rajan (2005).Should there be a coordinated response to the problem of global imbalances?  11
While the definition of the current account as the difference between investment and savings makes 
the aforementioned arguments an obvious place to start, they by no means exhaust the range of alternative 
interpretations. In addition there is a cluster of arguments focusing not on aggregate rates of saving and in-
vestment but on the tendency for U.S. foreign investments to earn a higher return than U.S. foreign liabili-
ties and for the country’s stock of net foreign liabilities to rise less quickly in value than the sum of its current 
account deficits. U.S. deficits are sustainable in this view because the resulting debts are small and inexpen-
sive to service. There being no problem of sustainability, there is no need for policy adjustments, coordinated 
or otherwise. Again, the currency of this view complicates the prospects for a “grand bargain.”
Gourinchas and Rey (2005) show that compositional effects explain part of observed rate of return 
differentials: U.S. foreign assets are skewed toward high-return FDI, while U.S. foreign liabilities are more 
heavily composed of low-return debt securities.33 In this view, the U.S. current account reflects the greater 
risk tolerance of American foreign investors, higher yields on U.S. foreign assets being compensation for the 
greater risk of equity investments.34 Kitchen (2006) shows that part of the differential is also explained by the 
fact that America’s direct foreign investments outperform direct foreign investments in the United States.35 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) show that these historical rate-of-return differentials have been reflected in 
expected ways in increases in the value of U.S. foreign investments and relative to the value of the invest-
ments of residents of other countries in the United States.36
Kitchen (2006) lays out the scenario in which historical rate of return relationships continue to hold 
and the U.S. also continues to enjoy the same tendency for its foreign investments to appreciate in value, 
while foreigners suffer capital losses on their more poorly chosen investments in the United States. He shows 
that it will then cost the United States less than one per cent of GDP to finance a net external debt of 50 per 
cent of GDP. Indeed, even if the current account does not adjust, the fact that foreigners continue to incur 
capital losses on their investments in the United States (relative to valuation changes for U.S. investments 
abroad) implies that the ratio of net foreign debt to GDP stabilizes in the neighborhood of 75 per cent, 
lower than the levels implied by the standard analysis.37 It will still cost the United States less than 2 per cent 
of GDP to service this net external debt, since U.S. investments abroad are much more remunerative than 
foreign investments in the United States.
The question is whether one should expect these patterns to persist. There is no guarantee that U.S. 
FDI abroad will continue to outperform FDI by other countries in the United States. Investors learn from 
their mistakes, and anecdotal evidence like the performance and profitability of Japanese automobile facto-
ries in the United States compared to that of U.S. automobile companies’ operations abroad does not suggest 
that American FDI abroad is always and everywhere superior. U.S. net interest payments on the debt securi-
ties in which foreigners invest have been depressed by the Greenspan Conundrum (the unusually low level 
33  Note the caveat in the text that this is only part of the story, the remainder being explained by exchange rate 
movements. I return to this below.
34  Debt being serviced before dividends are paid.
35  One thinks here of the golf courses and high-rise office buildings purchased by Japanese investors in the United States 
in the 1980s and 1990s.
36  An investment that yields a higher rate of return will have a higher capitalized income stream; hence the capital gains 
on U.S. investments abroad relative to foreign investments in the United States.
37  According to the standard analysis (Mussa 2004, Roubini and Setser 2004, Yoshitomi 2006), the indefinite 
maintenance of a current account deficit of 7 ½ per cent of GDP by a country whose rate of nominal GDP growth is 5 
per cent (3 per cent real growth plus 2 per cent inflation) implies an eventual ratio of net external debt to GDP of 150 
per cent.12  DESA Working Paper No. 69
of interest rates), which will not last forever.38 It is revealing in this connection that the average return on for-
eign investment in the United States fell from 3.6 per cent in 2000 to 2.4 per cent in 2003, just when U.S. 
interest rates were declining.39 With foreign living standards converging toward American living standards 
and wealthier individuals having more scope for bearing risk, there should be a tendency for historical dif-
ferences in the composition of national foreign investment portfolios to diminish. And now that the higher 
yield on U.S. foreign investments is attracting attention, residents of other countries will presumably revise 
their allocation decisions so as not to be consistently outperformed by their American counterparts. These 
arguments all paint a gloomier picture of the sustainability of the U.S. current account and support the case 
for early adjustment.
Similarly, Lane and Milesi-Ferreti show that the valuation effects they detect are explained mainly by 
exchange rate fluctuations. With U.S. foreign liabilities, such as treasury and agency securities, denominated 
in dollars while U.S. foreign assets are primarily denominated in foreign currencies, dollar depreciation has 
strengthened the U.S. net foreign investment position. As some authors put it, the U.S. has regularly fooled 
foreign investors into holding about-to-be-devalued claims (Roubini and Setser 2004, Frankel 2006). The 
obvious question is whether it can keep doing so. Those of a skeptical persuasion suggest that a shift away 
from dollar-denominated claims on the United States to claims on countries with stronger currencies is 
inevitable. Such a shift would make financing the U.S. deficit more difficult. It could precipitate a sharp fall 
in the dollar and financial distress if it occurred suddenly.
The most provocative variant of the argument is that of Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2006). The 
authors suggest that since U.S. net interest income from abroad remained positive (at some $30 billion) in 
2005, U.S. foreign investments, valued to reflect their income-generating capacity, must exceed U.S. foreign 
investors’ claims on the United States, similarly measured so as to reflect their true economic value.40 More-
over, since U.S. net interest income did not decline significantly in the 25 years through 2005, neither did 
the value of the country’s net foreign investments in a meaningful economic sense. In turn this must mean 
that the U.S. has not actually been running current account deficits.
To explain the discrepancy the authors suggest that the official accounting must be failing to capture 
U.S. exports of reputation (the brand value of companies like Disney and Coca Cola, and the reputation 
of the U.S. government for preserving the value of its debts) that are packaged together with U.S. exports 
of observable goods and services. Three categories of U.S. exports must be under-recorded: U.S. liquidity ser-
vices (seignorage), U.S. insurance services (secure investments), and U.S. knowledge services (organizational 
knowledge and brand recognition) because they were bundled with three types of financial instruments: U.S. 
currency held by foreigners, U.S. treasury bonds held by foreigners, and U.S.-originated FDI.
The objection to this analysis is that there is no reason to take the official figures on net income from 
abroad as accurate while dismissing those for the current account as meaningless.41 There is ample room in 
practice for misstating income by using transfer pricing to shift profits between national subsidiaries—and 
38  Already we have begun to see some normalization of the relevant interest rates. U.S. rates are still anomalously low, 
although whether this reflects the persistence of the Conundrum or expectations of weakening economic activity (the 
inverted yield curve that traditionally signals recession) remains to be seen.
39  See Setser (2006). 
40  The 5 per cent interest rate they use to capitalize income streams has been attacked as arbitrary, but their essential point 
would still follow for any constant positive interest rate.
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considerable incentive for doing so to minimize tax liabilities.42 Gros (2006), for one, argues that foreign 
companies have been understating the profits of their U.S. subsidiaries in order to avoid taxes.
The most plausible form of under-recorded U.S. exports is probably U.S liquidity services, reflect-
ing the reserve-currency role of the dollar. The U.S. treasury market is the world’s deepest and most liquid 
financial market. Foreign central banks seeking to accumulate reserves have naturally preferred to accumulate 
dollars. Because U.S. treasuries are so liquid, foreigners are willing hold them despite their relatively low 
pecuniary yields, and this “exorbitant privilege” contributes to the observed yield differential on U.S. foreign 
assets and liabilities. Although foreign financial markets have gained liquidity over time, liquid liabilities 
(defined as the sum of debt, trade credit and bank loans) still account for a remarkably high 60 per cent of 
all U.S. foreign liabilities.43
The value of this exorbitant privilege is not easy to measure. Gourinchas and Rey estimate that the 
U.S. has paid roughly 300 basis points less on liquid liabilities placed with foreign investors than foreigners 
have paid to place liquid liabilities with American investors. U.S. liquid assets abroad come to roughly 25 
per cent of U.S. GDP. By this measure, the exorbitant privilege is worth ¾ of one per cent (25 per cent times 
0.03) of U.S. GDP per year.44
This benefit is not inconsequential. It is roughly equivalent to a quarter’s worth of economic growth. 
At the same time it reduces the amount of foreign funding needed to finance a U.S. current account deficit 
currently approaching 7 per cent of U.S. GDP by little more than a tenth.
Moreover, there are reasons to doubt that the U.S. will monopolize the global market in liquidity 
services to the same extent in the future. The third quarter of the 20th century, when only the United States 
possessed deep and liquid financial markets easily accessible to foreign investors, was an anomaly. With the 
liberalization and development of their financial systems, other countries and regions have enhanced the 
liquidity of their financial markets. Most dramatically, the advent of Europe’s single currency has stimulated 
the development of a continental market in euro-denominated government bonds. With the removal of capi-
tal controls, foreign investors have gained easier access. For all these reasons, there is reason to anticipate that 
the dollar will face more intense competition from other currencies. If network externalities are important, 
one can imagine that the dollar will remain dominant until a tipping point is reached, at which point foreign 
central banks will shift en masse into another currency such as the euro (Chinn and Frankel 2005). If one 
doubts the importance of network externalities, then the development of liquid debt markets in other coun-
tries suggests that there will instead be more gradual diversification out of the dollar and that, in the future, 
several reserve currencies will coexist (Eichengreen 2005). Either way the dollar’s exorbitant privilege will do 
less to relieve pressure on the country’s balance of payment than has been the case in prior years.45
42  Hung and Mascaro (2005) note that this view is supported by the fact that the rate of return on U.S. owned FDI in 
Ireland was triple that on overall U.S. FDI between 1999 and 2003, while that on U.S. FDI in Bermuda was double 
the overall average.
43  As of 2004, according to Gourinchas and Rey (2005). Caballero, Farhis and Gourinchas (2006) generalize this 
argument, hypothesizing that the U.S. has a comparative advantage in generating financial assets that the residents of 
other countries wish to hold. Here the relevant denominator for calculations of the contribution of this “industry” to 
the U.S. balance of payments would take as its basis not just U.S. debt securities held by foreigners but all financial 
claims (debt plus equity) held by foreigners.
44  Note that this figure would be smaller were it calculated on the basis of debt securities alone and not all liquid liabilities 
to foreigners.
45  In the Caballero, Farhis and Gourinchas variant, one can similarly question whether other countries, as they develop 
more sophisticated financial markets and institutions, will continue lagging the United States in their ability to 
generate financial claims that others will wish to hold.14  DESA Working Paper No. 69
A final reason that some observers question the need for current account adjustment is the “Bret-
ton Woods II” or “Global Co-dependency” view (see e.g. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber 2003, Mann 
2004) that emerging markets are willing to continue financing the U.S. current account for an extended 
period, questions about its ultimate sustainability or not. The most influential argument along these lines is 
that emerging markets—above all China, but extending to the rest of Asia and other regions—benefit from 
maintaining exchange rates that are pegged at low levels against the dollar and exporting their way to faster 
growth. Japan pioneered this strategy in the 1950s and 1960s, and virtually every emerging market that has 
sustained high growth for an extended period subsequently has emulated its example.46 The export sector 
is the locus of learning and productivity spillovers; a stable, competitively valued currency that boosts the 
growth of exports also makes a country a more attractive destination for inward FDI and portfolio capital 
flows. Thus, even if the dollar ultimately stands to lose value against other currencies, Asian governments and 
central banks will be reluctant to curtail the foreign exchange market intervention that keeps their currencies 
from appreciating and results in their massive accumulation of international reserves, for fear of disrupting 
this process of export-led growth. If the consequence is capital losses on dollar reserves, then this is an ac-
ceptable price to pay for prosperity.
The appeal of this model is its consistency with the observation that foreign central banks and not 
private investors have been providing much of the finance for the U.S. deficit in recent years. It helps to 
explain the bond market “conundrum” insofar as foreign central banks are the marginal purchasers of U.S. 
treasury bonds, as well as the coexistence of U.S. deficits with low interest rates.
But note that the argument is not that the current constellation of imbalances is sustainable indefi-
nitely. Ultimately emerging markets, in Asia and elsewhere, will exit the stage of export-led growth and allow 
their currencies to appreciate, as Japan did in the 1970s and 1980s (Obstfeld 2006). Like Japan before it, 
China cannot suppress the growth of the service sector forever. Nor will it wish to do so insofar as the service 
sector and not just industry can be a locus of knowledge spillovers and learning by doing. China cannot keep 
on running savings rates of nearly 50 per cent of GDP and current account surpluses forever; sooner or later 
it will want to graduate from a growth model based on exports of merchandise to one based on a better bal-
ance of domestic and foreign demand and between the industrial and service sectors (Eichengreen 2006d).
The problem for policy coordination is that this transition is not without risks.47 China and other 
Asian countries are understandably reluctant to tamper with success. And even if it is in the collective inter-
est of Asian countries to keep the dollar up and, by implication, their currencies down, it is in their indi-
vidual interest to curtail their purchases of dollar-denominated assets and diversify their reserves into other 
currencies in order to avoid capital losses; thus, maintaining the present situation also poses a problem of 
collective action (Eichengreen 2004).
46  A clear statement of this view is Sachs (1985).
47  Japan’s experience with currency appreciation was not entirely happy: growth slowed significantly in the 1970s, 
following the country’s exit from its 360-yen-to-the-dollar peg, and some observers (viz. McKinnon and Schnabl 
2003) blame pressure on the Bank of Japan for the bubble economy of the 1980s and the slump of the 1990s. In their 
view, it would be better for Asian countries, China in particular, to resist calls for currency appreciation as part of an 
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These are reasons for thinking that the current constellation of global imbalances will not persist 
indefinitely.48 That said, there is uncertainty about how soon it will begin to disintegrate and how disorderly 
the adjustment will be.49 This uncertainty in turn complicates efforts to develop a consensus in favor of 
adjustment.
Thus, essentially all the analytical obstacles to macroeconomic policy coordination pointed to in 
Frankel (1989) arise in the current context. There is uncertainty about the initial position of the economies 
involved: is the U.S. on the verge of a recession, creating the danger that tax increases would push it over 
the edge? Is or is not China at risk of overheating? There is disagreement about the causes of the current 
position—about exactly why the U.S. is in deficit and other countries, Asian countries in particular, are in 
surplus. There is uncertainty about future prospects: there are different perspectives on the danger of ex-
plosive growth of U.S. debt/export and debt/GDP ratios that derive from different views on the economy’s 
sustainable rate of growth; and there are different views of how currency appreciation would affect the 
export-dependent Asian economies. There is disagreement about the domestic effects of policy adjustments: 
will exiting from its dollar peg allow China to smoothly graduate from export-led growth to a domestic-
demand-led growth model, or will it consign the country to a deflationary spiral? Would fiscal stimulus to 
offset the demand-reducing effects of a tighter monetary policy be productive or counterproductive? What 
would be the change in the current account balance resulting from a $1 reduction in the fiscal balance?50 Fi-
nally, there is uncertainty about nature of the cross-border spillovers: would tax increases in the United States 
depress economic growth abroad by reducing U.S. import demands, or would they stimulate growth abroad 
by limiting the upward pressure on global interest rates imparted by U.S. financing needs?
These interpretive disagreements may not be insurmountable obstacles to achieving on a coordinated 
response to global imbalances (as described in Section 4), but neither will they be easy to overcome.
Resistance from interest groups. Different constituencies—exporters versus producers of home 
goods, high- versus low-income households, capital versus labor—are affected differently by the same 
macroeconomic policy adjustments. Even when there is agreement that a coordinated set of national policy 
adjustments is good for each country overall—that it raises the present value of expected future national 
incomes—it may work to the disadvantage of a subset of residents. And, in the absence of mechanisms for 
compensating the losers, they will resist implementation.
In the United States, for example, the construction industry and other sectors producing nontraded 
goods have self-interested reasons to oppose a weaker dollar that would shift resources into traded goods 
production. The direct beneficiaries of the tax cuts of the last six years—high-income Americans by most 
48  As even the founders of the Bretton Woods II school have acknowledged (Dooley and Garber 2005). There are 
additional grounds on which the accuracy of this interpretation can be questioned, as noted elsewhere. For example, 
the argument that a stable, competitively valued exchange rate is desirable to promote exports does not provide an 
adequate rationale for pegging to the dollar in particular, when only a minority of the exports of the countries in 
question go to the United States, or for that matter to the United States and other dollar peggers. The idea that Asian 
countries benefit from the maintenance of high levels of exports is not the same as arguing that they should be running 
chronic current account surpluses; they may wish high levels of imports as well. To explain this the proponents of the 
Bretton Woods II view must add another element, such as the idea that the accumulation of reserves serves as collateral 
that renders emerging markets a more attractive destination for FDI (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber 2004).
49  Thus, to support their view that the adjustment will be relatively benign, Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2005) 
argue that even if Asian central banks sell the dollar en masse, the European Central Bank will buy it to prevent the 
euro from appreciating excessively and further damaging European economic growth.
50  There is a wide range of empirical estimates of this elasticity; see U.S. Treasury (2006).16  DESA Working Paper No. 69
calculations—have a self interest in resisting calls to reverse out or sunset those measures. Cuts in capital 
gains taxation, estate taxation, and top marginal rates disproportionately benefit high-income households. 
Thus, even if it is accepted that cutting the budget deficit and therefore the current account deficit is good 
for the country as a whole, whether unilaterally or in conjunction with complementary policy adjustments 
abroad, interest groups within the country may prevent these policies from being implemented.
In China’s case, it is less obvious that the central government in Beijing is constrained by special-
interest politics. But it must work in harmony with local governments, many of which are substantial export-
ers through their Town-and-Village Enterprises and thus have reason to resist significant current apprecia-
tion. The governments of the coastal regions that benefit disproportionately from the current export-based 
development model (owing to their location) would similarly resist a change in the policy mix that shifted 
demand toward nontraded goods.
Stakeholders in state-owned enterprises that would not be viable in the face of higher labor costs 
would similarly resist any policy that results in real appreciation. The government also seeks to encourage 
private manufacturing enterprise and to attract foreign direct investment into the export sector. When it 
hears potential foreign investors warning that renminbi appreciation will make them more reluctant to com-
mit to new projects, it has an understandable tendency to think twice.
Of course, pressure from special interests can also strengthen the hand of those seeking to engineer 
coordinated policy adjustments. Thus, at the time of the 1985 Plaza Agreement, U.S. manufacturers and 
their workers, especially those concentrated in the so-called “rust belt” states of the Midwest, were dispro-
portionately impacted by the rise in the dollar and consequently supported an initiative to push the currency 
down. Importers who feared a protectionist backlash similarly saw merit in a coordinated response. In the 
present context, U.S. exporters would presumably favor a weaker dollar.51 Chinese importers and producers 
of services would presumably support a stronger renminbi. The Chinese government clearly pays attention to 
spontaneous demonstrations and other manifestations of rural unrest; thus, a growth model based on exports 
and a low exchange rate that disproportionately benefit coastal regions at the expense of the rural interior 
may be seen as less attractive on distributional grounds.
For those convinced that coordinated policy adjustments would be a global welfare improvement, 
the issue then becomes how to mobilize the special interests who stand to benefit from the direct effects, and 
how to compensate the losers.
Absence of adequate policy tools. In the literature on coordinated adjustments to correct the problem of 
global imbalances, one often hears calls for the United States to boost private savings rates. It is easier to 
present this request than for policy makers to implement it. In practice, we know relatively little about how 
the standard policy variables affect household saving, the component of private saving that has fallen most 
dramatically in recent years. To put the point another way, we have at best a limited understanding of why 
savings rates vary so dramatically. The determinants of savings rates pointed to by standard approaches like 
the life-cycle model (Modigliani 1970), interest rates for example, explain only a small part of observed 
variations. As noted above, the predictions of the Ricardian model, which suggest that private savings should 
move inversely with the aggregate fiscal balance, are contradicted by the recent behavior of household savings 
51  One might make the same argument about the future generations of Americans who will bear the burden of servicing 
U.S. debts, although in fact this example points up the opposite problem, that the interests of future generations are 
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in the United States. If monetary policy, which shapes the evolution of interest rates, and fiscal policy, which 
helps to determine the budget balance, have little systematic impact on household savings behavior, then 
there may be little that macroeconomic policy makers, who are the principals in policy coordination discus-
sions, can do to reliably influence private savings.
Other factors may matter more for private saving, but these may themselves be more difficult to 
control. Carroll and Summers (1990) analyzed savings rates in the U.S. and Canada, two economies with 
many macroeconomic, institutional and geographic similarities but very different savings rates. U.S. and Ca-
nadian savings rates diverged in the early 1980s (U.S. savings fell, Canadian savings rose) after having moved 
in tandem for 25 years. Carroll and Summers attribute this to divergences in the behavior of asset prices 
(on the grounds that capital gains that raise household wealth reduce household saving) and tax structures 
(pointing to differences in the tax treatment of interest payments on household debt). Unfortunately for 
policy, asset prices can have a mind of their own. Whether or not a rise in interest rates will prick a bubble 
and, more generally, how it will affect asset valuations is uncertain. The literature on whether monetary 
policy should respond to asset prices, much of which emphasizes these uncertainties, points to the problem-
atic nature targeting asset prices. Targeting asset prices in order to influence private savings rates is only a 
specific instance of the general point.
It is also problematic to advocate changes in the structure of taxation as part of a policy coordination 
exercise. The structure of taxes is, if anything, even more politically contentious than the level; cutting some 
people’s taxes has even more visible distributional consequences than cutting everyone’s taxes. Changes in the 
tax code are difficult to push through parliament or congress in the time frame relevant to policy coordina-
tion exercises. The effects are uncertain: the capital gains and estate tax cuts of the Bush Administration did 
not result in higher private savings rates, as their proponents predicted. If the most important thing the U.S. 
can do to raise household savings is to eliminate the tax deductability of mortgage interest payments, then it 
is hard to imagine a more politically contentious proposal.
The upshot is that macroeconomic policy makers face a shortage of instruments suitable for imple-
menting calls to raise U.S. private savings rates.
What is To be Done?
The preceding analysis points in turn to steps that governments and the international policy community can 
take to encourage coordinated responses to the problem of global imbalances.
Develop a consensus on common goals through international consultations with outside mediation. There 
is unlikely to be international action to address global imbalances absent agreement that those imbalances are 
a problem. Agreement on goals is more likely when there is sharing of information and analysis and when 
there exists an outside body to impartially adjudicate disputes. The obvious analogy is with marriage counsel-
ing: just as a husband and wife may be better able to air their differences and agree on common goals and 
desirable behavioral changes in a neutral forum with impartial mediation, governments may similarly be able 
to agree on macroeconomic policy changes in such a setting.
This is the idea behind the multilateral consultations inaugurated by the International Monetary 
Fund in the spring of 2006. According to IMF (2006), these consultations will provide a “forum for debate” 
among parties to a common economic issue. The aim is to enable the Fund and its members to agree on 
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Members will exchange information and views, with the IMF acting as honest broker. The first such consul-
tation, the managing director announced on 5 June 2006, will focus on global imbalances and involve the 
United States, the Euro Area, Japan, China and Saudi Arabia. Its focus, appropriately, is to be on “spillovers 
and linkages among these and other economies, rather than on domestic economic issues.” Bilateral consul-
tations with the five parties, as the first stage, will then be followed with multilateral meetings, out of which, 
it is hoped, will develop agreement on a package of mutually-beneficial policy adjustments.
To be sure, there is no shortage of other venues, including some of long standing, for discussion and 
debate among national policy makers. There is the IMF Executive Board, where results from the Fund’s mul-
ticountry simulation model are discussed twice annually in conjunction with board discussions of the World 
Economic Outlook (WEO). There is the International Monetary and Financial Committee, the IMF’s steering 
committee, made up of finance ministers and central bank governors from the same 24 countries represented 
on the Executive Board, where the same issues are discussed. There are the Groups of 5, 7, 8, 10, 15, 20, 24, 
30 and 77. There is the Committee of Central Bank Governors and the Financial Stability Forum that meet 
under the umbrella of the Bank for International Settlements. Some of these clubs are more active than oth-
ers, and some are more suitable for addressing macroeconomic and financial vulnerabilities. But it is hard to 
argue that there is a shortage of relevant venues.
The strongest argument for a new mechanism and for the premise that consultations with outside 
mediation can make a difference is that none of these other groups is appropriately constituted for the 
problem at hand. In the case of global imbalances, the G5, 7, 8 and 10 do not include an important emerg-
ing market like China or an oil exporting state like Saudi Arabia. The larger groupings, for their part, are 
too unwieldy for productive discussion and debate.52 An advantage of the new mechanism is that it can be 
appropriately constituted to address the problem at hand. It possesses the flexibility needed to address new 
issues and, at the same time, should have more legitimacy than purely ad hoc consultations.
Enhance the context for mediation and the perceived legitimacy of the mediator. Marriage counseling 
will not succeed when the parties involved have irreconcilable differences. It will not work when ill will aris-
ing out of past disagreements poisons the atmosphere. It will not work when the parties to these consulta-
tions have other disagreements, over inter alia foreign policy and geopolitical affairs, complicating efforts to 
cooperate on economic and monetary affairs.
This is not to say that all other disagreements must be resolved for there to be progress on global 
imbalances. But there must be a willingness to acknowledge the existence of global interdependencies and 
a willingness to work through international institutions to achieve a cooperative solution. Thus, agreement 
on coordinated policy adjustments that work to everyone’s advantage is likely to be easier to reach against a 
backdrop of progress on other global political and security issues, reached through deliberations in the UN 
Security Council and other venues. For example, one can imagine that the United States and China will find 
it easier to agree on mutually advantageous adjustments in exchange rates and domestic policies if they reach 
at least a de facto understanding on the future of Taiwan.
In addition, mediation is unlikely work when there are doubts about the impartiality of the media-
tor. In the present context there is the problem that the IMF is a creature of its shareholders and that two 
of the parties to the first multilateral consultation, the United States and the Euro Area, have more votes 
52  Buira and Abeles (2006) suggest making the G20 the venue for negotiating a coordinated set of policy adjustments, 
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and leverage in the Fund than the other three participants. Thus, reforming governance and representation 
in the IMF, so that seats in the Executive Board and votes in the Fund better reflect 21st century realities, is 
critical for enhancing enhance the legitimacy of the Fund’s mediation in the longer run.53 A first step in this 
direction was taken at the annual meetings of the IMF and World Bank in Singapore, where it was agreed 
to increase quotas and votes for four particularly underrepresented countries (China, Korea, Turkey and 
Mexico) and to raise the number of basic votes cast by every country (regardless of size) as a way of enhanc-
ing the voice of poor countries. But more comprehensive governance reform is still required. There is the 
need for agreement on a new quota formula so that other rapidly growing countries see that their problem 
of underrepresentation is addressed—and that such problems will continue to be addressed over time. There 
is the need to update the composition of the Executive Board, where largely for historical reasons European 
countries occupy as many as 9 of the 24 seats (depending on whether Spain holds the chair of its largely 
Latin American constituency at any particular moment). There is the need to reform leadership selection, to 
ensure that the managing director and, indeed, the entire management team are chosen on the basis of their 
qualifications rather than as a matter of national prerogative. Finally, there is the need for greater indepen-
dence for management and staff to reassure all members that IMF advice is not unduly affected by politi-
cal pressure for particular shareholders. All this will ultimately be needed to enhance the legitimacy of the 
multilateral consultations process.
Reduce policy uncertainty through comparative model analysis. Perhaps most fundamentally, there 
are deep-seated disagreements over the severity of the vulnerabilities created by global imbalances—with 
the United States viewing the risks to itself and the global financial system as less serious than its counter-
parties—that discussion, debate and mediation on their own may do little to overcome. Moreover, having 
agreed on goals, governments must still agree on policies to achieve them. As we have seen, uncertainty 
about whether a particular package of policies will end up moving them closer or further from those goals 
may impart a status quo bias. Thus, as part of its process of multilateral consultation, the IMF can bring to 
the table model simulations of the effects of alternative policy packages on national and global macroeco-
nomic aggregates. It can provide its own estimates of key elasticities, such as the impact of changes in the 
fiscal balance on the trade balance. If these estimates and simulations are regarded as definitive, they will help 
to overcome the aforementioned status quo bias.
Of course, the IMF already brings its model simulations to the table as part of the WEO exercise. 
Not everyone will necessarily agree that its modeling is definitive. Some competing global simulation models 
point to rather different conclusions. The resulting uncertainty allows officials reluctant to acknowledge the 
need for change to dismiss assessments of vulnerability based on simulations of the IMF’s in-house model as 
less than convincing.
In the 1980s, in response to an earlier flurry of interest in international policy coordination, there 
was a private sector effort to overcome these problems by undertaking policy coordination simulations using 
a host of different national and global models and analyzing, among other things, which results were robust 
to changes in model selection and specification (see Bryant et al. 1989). One can imagine how these could 
help to cultivate agreement on the “meta-model.” Disagreement on how alternative policies will affect global 
imbalances and the macroeconomic performance of the major economies might be resolved, at least in part, 
by another such comparative modeling exercise.54
53  Although it is questionable whether fundamental reform of seats, votes and quotas can be completed in a time frame 
relevant to the orderly resolution of global imbalance.
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Address commitment problems by issuing multi-year schedules for policy adjustments. There are two ways 
of reassuring financial markets that excessive budget deficits leading to excessive current account deficits will 
be eliminated: eliminating them immediately and completely, and eliminating them gradually over time. 
The gradual approach is preferable in that it avoids shocking the economy with a large change in fiscal policy 
all at once. But investors will only be reassured if the commitment to continued adjustment is credible. A 
down payment on adjustment may not do much to reduce financial vulnerabilities if the markets doubt that 
governments will not follow up with additional installments. If a government is unconvinced of the need for 
adjustment, it may agree to token adjustments to get off the hook with its foreign partners with no intention 
of following up subsequently. In addition, officials find it difficult to commit their successors. Governments 
change; treasury and finance ministers change; parliaments and congresses can pass new legislation watering 
down or overturning previous legislation.
Perfect solutions to politically-grounded commitment problems do not exist in democratic societ-
ies. But a partial solution is to publish a multi-year schedule for adjustment. Announcing specific targets, in 
the form of a schedule, and then missing them has costs in terms of reputation. So does specifying a series of 
policy actions and then failing to implement them. As Frankel (1989) puts it, commitments in order to be 
credible must be attainable and readily monitored, which requires that they should be explicit, measurable 
and public.55
Governments already pre-specify schedules of actions in an effort to enhance the perception of 
commitment. The Bush Administration has declared its commitment to cutting the U.S. budget deficit as 
a share of GNP in half by 2009. The United States Congress has established a Congressional Budget Office 
charged with issuing nonpartisan multi-year projections and analyses of whether current policies will succeed 
in achieving such goals and, if not, what policy adjustments are needed. Members of the European Union 
are required to submit annually a multi-year (generally, five year) Stability Program (in the case of members 
of its monetary union) or a Convergence Program (in the case of countries that are not yet members of the 
Euro Area). These programs are then vetted by the European Commission and by the Ecofin Council of 
economics and finance ministers.
One can imagine similar schedules emanating from IMF’s consultations. The “deliverable” from the 
consultations process (the “multilateral latter of intent”) should be a sequence of policy adjustments tied to a 
specific schedule, to be made public at the end of the multilateral round.
That said, it is not obvious that the costs of reneging on those commitments subsequently would be 
as great as in the EU context. The IMF and the economic policy community generally lack leverage over the 
United States and China comparable to that possessed by the EU over countries submitting Convergence 
Programs. These countries can be denied membership in the monetary union if they fail to follow through 
on their commitments. The IMF possesses comparable leverage only over countries in a lending program—
which is not the case of any of the five countries that are party to its imbalances consultations. More gener-
ally, EU member states have constructed a dense web of interlocking bargains. A country that reneges on 
commitments in its Stability or Convergence Report runs the risk of jeopardizing these other bargains. There 
is a difference in extent, if not in kind, in the commitments that exist among parties to discussions of the 
resolution of global imbalances.
55  It is perhaps revealing in this context that the first time G5 finance ministers and central bank governors released an 
official public statement following one of their summits was in 1985, with the intensification of policy coordination 
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All this finesses the question of exactly what variables should be subject to these commitments. The 
longer the list, the more difficult it will be to monitor compliance.56 Moreover, a laundry list of targets will 
not be credible if the number of target variables exceeds the number of available instruments. Thus, it is im-
portant that multilateral letter of intent focus on a limited number of targets—reconciling the correction of 
external imbalances with the maintenance of growth and price stability at home—and verify that the num-
ber of instruments (the number of policy instruments for which settings will be modified) at least equal the 
number of targets (without exceeding their number to such an extent that monitoring compliance becomes 
problematic).
Conclusion
That the imbalance between the United States and the principal surplus economies arises out of policies and 
conditions in all the countries concerned makes it unlikely that any one government would be prepared to 
bear the costs of the policy initiatives needed to correct that imbalance on its own. That the deficits of one 
set of countries are the surpluses of the rest of the world means that measures by either group to reduce the 
imbalance also reduce the imbalance of the other—in other words there are cross-border spillovers that ac-
crue as an externality. And when there are effects external to a country, national policy makers operating in 
isolation will not have an incentive to implement the globally optimal policies. Together these observations 
point to the desirability of coordinating the response. Ideally, that response would combine measures to 
reduce the growth of spending in the United States (through policies of revenue enhancement to narrow the 
government budget deficit together with tax reforms designed to encourage household saving) with measures 
to stimulate the growth of spending in other countries (by boosting public expenditure in Asia and loosing 
monetary policy in Europe, insofar as there is room for pursuing these policies without aggravating debt and 
inflation problems, as well as by pushing ahead with structural reform). Reducing the growth of U.S. spend-
ing relative to the growth of spending in the rest of the world will require some adjustment of relative prices; 
as part of this coordinated response, governments will also have to permit adjustment of the exchange rate 
between the dollar and other currencies, including Asian currencies
But actually implementing this response will be easier said than done. There is less than complete 
consensus on risks posed by the current constellation of global imbalances. Even those governments that 
agree that adjustments are necessary do not agree on their urgency. Governments are uncertain about the 
initial position of their economies. They are uncertain about how policy initiatives will affect the current 
account and about how their own economies will be affected by policy initiatives abroad. Even were they to 
agree on a desirable package of coordinated policy adjustments, they would still face resistance from domes-
tic interest groups that stand to be adversely affected, notwithstanding the prospect of global welfare im-
provements. Governments also face a commitment problem, in that they would prefer that other countries 
bear the brunt of the adjustment; they may be reluctant to follow through on their part of the bargain. An 
effective resolution of existing imbalances requires sustained action over time, and governments often find it 
difficult to credibly commitment themselves, much less their successors in office.
56  This was a problem in the 1980s: in the wake of the Plaza Agreement, G5 finance ministers meetings were regularized 
by expanding them to include Canada and Italy and holding them under the aegis of the G7; the G7 then agreed 
on a list of ten “objective indicators” on which the policy coordination process would focus. It was not credible that 
governments would adjust fiscal and monetary policies to achieve such a long list of targets. Monitoring compliance 
was difficult. Thus, officials were able to blame a shortage of available instruments where in fact missing a target could 
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Theory and experience point to steps that can help in overcoming these obstacles. Exchanging 
information and analysis through frank discussions in a neutral venue with impartial mediation can fos-
ter a consensus on the nature and sources of the problem. Here initiating multilateral consultations under 
the stewardship of the IMF is a step in the right direction. This initiative provides the flexibility needed to 
constitute an appropriate grouping, not too large but at the same time comprised of the countries that have 
played the most prominent role in the development of the imbalance and that can do the most to bring 
about its orderly resolution. The IMF can provide a neutral venue and impartial mediation; making this first 
consultation on global imbalances part of an ongoing initiative, in which different issues involving global 
interdependencies are discussed at different points in time, lends the process more legitimacy and structure 
than a purely ad hoc approach. The IMF can provide systematic analysis, in the form of model simulations, 
of both the risks and the effects of policy adjustments.
More ambitiously, the IMF can encourage countries to commit to a multi-year schedule of current 
account targets and policy adjustments. In the same way that announcing an inflation target and an inflation 
forecast can lend credibility to the anti-inflationary policies of a central bank, making public an agreed se-
quence of current account targets and describing the models designed to achieve them can lend credibility to 
the commitment to bring about an orderly resolution of global imbalances. Announcing an explicit schedule 
can also help to address the time-consistency problem—the temptation for countries to renege on their part 
of the bargain insofar as they prefer to see their foreign partners bear the brunt of the costs of adjusting poli-
cies, and the resulting reluctance of anyone to adjust.
To be sure, current account outcomes are harder to observe than inflation outcomes: current ac-
count data becomes available with longer lags and can be subject to larger revisions. The association between 
current account outcomes and domestic policies is more complex and disputable than the association be-
tween monetary policies and inflation outcomes. Hence markets may be less capable of holding governments 
to their commitments and effectively sanctions those that deviate. This creates an argument for a multilateral 
body like the IMF to monitor compliance with commitments and make strong public statements if govern-
ments fail to adhere.
The IMF will be effective in this role if its statements don’t mince words and its advice is regarded 
as legitimate. Thus, the Fund’s role in the resolution of global imbalances points up, yet again, the urgency 
of reforming the structure and governance of the institution. Making the IMF more independent of gov-
ernments, as suggested by De Gregorio et al. (1999) and King (2006), will better enable it to issue clear 
and forceful evaluations of country policies in the course of multilateral surveillance. Comprehensive quota 
reform, something that was begun at the September 2006 annual meetings in Singapore, and revising the 
country composition of the International Monetary and Financial Committee to give more voice and repre-
sentation to rapidly-growing emerging markets that are currently on the surplus side of the imbalances equa-
tion will invest the Fund’s advice and recommendations with more legitimacy; traditionally underrepresented 
countries (like China) will be more inclined to cooperate insofar as they are confident that their views are 
reflected in the strategies of the institution. Multilateral institutions like the IMF can effectively contribute 
to the orderly resolution of global imbalances only if representation in and the operation of those institutions 
is updated to reflect the realities of the 21st century.
This emphasis on the need for more fundamental reform of the multilateral financial institutions is a 
specific instance of the general point that deeper reform of the global monetary and financial system may be 
required to prevent similar problems from arising again the future. The current pattern of global imbalances Should there be a coordinated response to the problem of global imbalances?  23
emerged, in part, because developing countries, following the financial crises of the 1990s, saw it necessary 
to accumulate international reserves as protection against renewed instability. Since the dollar was the lead-
ing reserve currency, this meant accumulating dollars, which in turn meant providing easy finance for the 
U.S. current account. Now that developing countries have augmented their dollar balances, they are reluc-
tant to alter their reserve portfolios or the policies that facilitated the emergence of the U.S. deficit for fear of 
precipitating a fall in the dollar and inflicting capital losses upon themselves. This “balance of financial ter-
ror” (Summers 2004) allows the U.S. deficit to persist and the country’s foreign indebtedness to grow until 
some inevitable point at which doubts about the sustainability of its debts precipitate reserve diversification 
and other policy adjustments by one creditor country and others scramble out of dollars in order to avoid 
being left holding the bag.
This is an intrinsic problem with a system in which a single national currency is used as international 
reserves, as Keynes emphasized in the negotiations that led to the creation of the Bretton Woods System and 
Robert Triffin analyzed in his writings predicting its demise.57 Rapidly growing countries require additional 
reserves, which allows the more slowly growing reserve-currency country to run balance-of-payments deficits 
for a time. Eventually, however, the fact that the external obligations of the reserve-currency country grow 
faster than its economy puts the sustainability of its external position into doubt. And when those doubts 
reach a critical mass, there can be a scramble out of that currency, causing its exchange rate to come crashing 
down.
Over time, there may develop a market solution to this problem. If there exist a number of compet-
ing reserve currencies, each of which accounts for a significant share of foreign reserve portfolios, it will be 
easier for central banks to alter the composition of their reserves continuously over time and avoid situations 
where serious doubt arise about the value of a specific reserve currency and the sustainability of the obliga-
tions of its issuer. Some authors have argued that the day of multiple reserve currencies may already be at 
hand.58 They suggest that the post-World War II period was exceptional; because of a unique set of historical 
circumstances, only the United States had both deep and internationally-open financial markets, making 
the dollar the dominant reserve currency of the day. Now, in contrast, there are a growing number of other 
economies (the euro area and Japan, for example) whose financial markets are both liquid and open to for-
eign financial investment. Moreover, the network effects that made a single national money so attractive and 
economical as the vehicle for international transactions (international investment in particular) operate less 
powerfully in a world where there exists a proliferation of financial instruments to facilitate transactions in 
different currencies. If so, the dilemma identified by Keynes and Triffin may be less corrosive to the stability 
of the international monetary and financial system in the future than in the past.
Alternatively, the development of a multiple reserve currency world may take longer than the opti-
mists suppose. If so, there may be an argument for revisiting Keynes’ case for the creation of a reserve asset 
that does not take the form of a national money, precisely in order to avoid a repeat of recent problems.59
57  See Triffin (1947, 1960).
58  See Eichengreen (2005).
59  There is a long history of such proposals, the most recent of which is Stiglitz (2006).24  DESA Working Paper No. 69
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